Ralph Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, Daniel Neil Ipson : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Ralph Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, Daniel Neil
Ipson : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
MERLIN R. LYBBERT; KIM R. WILSON; HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN; GRAIG S. COOK;
WORSLEY SNOW and CHRISTENSEN; ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS.
Unknown.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, No. 14267.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/223
RECEIVED 
jLAW L I B U A R Y 
13 JUN 1377 
tmilAM YCUJG J^SSiTY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH •-? Cz.'.l LiV Swool 
RALPH BRUNYER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
corporation, and DANIEL NEIL IPSON, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
No. 14267 
EMIL ZlGICH, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
ILl: z \ « I"  . 
lbio 
-CS*^-"-***.. 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
KIM R. WILSON 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN (on the Brief) 
CRAIG S. COOK (on the Brief) 
of 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH BRUNYER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
corporation, and DANIEL NEIL IPSON, 
No. 14267 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EMIL ZIGICH, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
KIM R. WILSON 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN (on the Brief) 
CRAIG S. COOK (on the Brief) 
of 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
POINT I. 
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THIS CASE 
DOES NOT REQUIRE THE RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION 
ACT BECAUSE THE "CAUSE OF ACTION" 
HAS NOT YET ACCRUED 1 
POINT II. 
THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION 
STATUTE DOES NOT TAKE AWAY OR IMPAIR 
VESTED RIGHTS ACQUIRED UNDER EXISTING 
LAWS PRIOR TO ITS ENACTMENT, DOES NOT 
CREATE A NEW OBLIGATION, DOES NOT 
IMPOSE A NEW DUTY, AND DOES NOT ATTACH 
A NEW DISABILITY IN RESPECT TO TRANS-
ACTIONS OR CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY PAST . . . . 7 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIMISSING THE 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT WAS PREMATURE 
SINCE NO PAYMENT HAD BEEN MADE IN EXCESS 
OF DEFENDANTS PRO RARA SHARE OF COMMON 
LIABILITY 11 
POINT IV. 
RESPONDENT IS IN ERROR WHEN HE ARGUES 
THAT APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS ARE NOT 
JOINT TORT FEASORS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
CONTRIBUTION IN THAT THEIR LIABILITY 
IS NOT COMMON 12 
POINT V. 
RESPONDENT IS IN ERROR IN CLAIMING 
THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS 
RUN AS TO THE RESPONDENT IN ANY ACTION 
EMINATING FROM THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF 
LOUISE BRUYNER 13 
CONCLUSION 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Page 
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 
114 M.W.2d 105 . . 4 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company 
v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 919,923 (Utah 1943) 10 
Joseph v. Lowery, 495 P.2d 273 (Or. 1972) . . . . . . 5,8 
Oakland Construction Company v. 
The Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208 
(Cal. 1974) 4 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 268 P.2d 689 (1954) 6,9,1 
STATUTES 
Section 68-3-3, U.C.A., 1953 2,8 
Sections 78-27-37, et seq., U.C.A., 1953 3,9 
Section 49-9-1, U.C.A., 1953 12 
Section 41-6-44, U.C.A., 1953 12 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
"What Statute of Limitations Applies to Actions 
for Contribution Against Joint Tort Feasor," 
57 A.L.R.3d 927,929 14 
"Automobiles: Right of Third-Person to Recover 
Contribution from Host Driver for Injuries 
or Death of Guest, Where Host is not Liable 
to Guest under Guest Statute," 26 A.L.R.3d 1283 14 
73 Am. Jur. 2d Section 95, Statutes, p. 320-321 . . . 4 
Prosser, Law of Torts (3rd Edition) p. 309 14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH BRUYNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
corporation, and DANIEL 
IPSON, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Third-Party Plain-
tiffs, 
vs. 
EMIL ZIGICH, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
POINT I 
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THIS CASE DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF 
THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION ACT BECAUSE THE 
"CAUSE OF ACTION" HAS NOT YET ACCRUED. 
Appellants, in our original brief, have argued that the 
contribution statute enacted by the 1973 Legislature does 
not require retroactive application in order for a cause of 
action in the instant case to be maintained against respon-
dent. The reason for this assertion is extremely simple: 
while the accident itself occurred prior to the enactment 
of the statute, the cause of action for contribution has not 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
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accrued until a judgment has been obtained against the appel-
lant and until appellant is forced to pay to the plaintiff 
in this case damages in excess of appellant's pro rata share 
of joint liability* 
Respondent Zigich spends many pages in his brief citing 
authorities stating that statutes should generally be held 
as prospective and not retrospective and citing further author-
ities that Comparative Negligence should not be applied retro-
actively. Unfortunately/ these arguments and authorities have 
no application to the present case. 
Firstf even though there is an expressed statute in Utah 
relating to retroactive application of a statute (Section 
68-3-3/ U.C.A.) the exceptions, even to this type of statute, 
are those laws relating only to procedure and remedies. 
Thus, as discussed in Point II of this brief/ the Contri-
bution Statutes can be applied retroactively since they are 
remedial legislation. 
Second/ those cases cited by respondent concerning 
Comparative Negligence are not in point in the present con-
troversy. As previously noted in Appellants1 main brief/ 
there is a great distinction between a Contribution Statute 
and a Comparative Negligence Statute. A contribution statute 
concerns the rights and liabilities between joint tort 
feasors who have incurred a common liability to the injured 
party. The victim of the tort has a "right" to choose any 
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or all of the tort feasors in an action to recover damages 
for the injury. The fact that the victim may pick and 
choose which tort feasor he wishes to sue does not in any 
way change the obligation existing at the time of the acci-
dent to the victim. Any recovery made by a fellow tort 
feasor in contribution is made as an indirect result of the 
original liability between all tort feasors and the victim. 
On the other hand, Comparative Negligence affects the 
rights and obligations between the tort feasor and the vic-
tim which is substantially different from the doctrine of 
Contributory Negligence. In Comparative Negligence, a tort 
feasor may be held liable for damages even though the victim 
is also negligent in his actions. In Contributory Negligence, 
however, even the slightest degree of fault on the part of 
the victim precluded recovery. Therefore, assuming that a 
victim was 3 per cent negligent and that a tort feasor was 
97 per cent negligent, in the case of Comparative Negli-
gence the victim could recover 97 per cent of his damages 
while in the case of Contributory Negligence no recovery 
could be made. It is for this reason that the majority of 
courts, as noted by the respondent, have been unwilling to 
apply Comparative Negligence Statutes retroactively. 
Respondent's argument that Sections 78-27-37 through 43 
all constitute the "Comparative Negligence Act" is erroneous. 
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Although house bill No. 25 has been referenced as "Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act" such title is not part of the 
Act itself but is merely an abbreviation for clerical usage. 
Such references are not controlling in statutory construc-
tion. 73 Am.Jur.2d Section 95, Statutes, p. 320-321. The 
correct title of the "Act" in which the contribution sec-
tions appear is "An Act Relating To Actions For the Recovery 
of Damages in Actions Based on Negligence or Gross Negligence". 
Clearly, the sections relating to Comparative Negligence 
(78-27-37 and 38) are separable from those relating to con-
tribution among joint tort feasors. 
If this separation was not the case, respondent would 
have to argue that contribution is directly related to Com-
parative Negligence and that without a Comparative Negli-
gence Statute there can be no contribution. Obviously, the 
doctrine of Contribution and the doctrine of Comparative 
Negligence are independent of one another to the extent that 
contribution may be obtained regardless of the negligence 
theory utilized in a jurisdiction between a tort feasor and 
an injured party. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 114 
M.W.2d 105. 
Even authorities cited by the respondent are consistent 
with appellant's view of the contribution statute. For ex-
ample, in the Oakland Construction Company case cited by 
respondent (Respondent's brief, p. 7) this court stated that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a statute is not to be applied retroactively if it "deprived a 
party of his rights or imposed greater liability upon him". 
Obviously, allowing one joint tort feasor to recover a pro 
rata share from another does not deprive him of any right 
since both tort feasors are liable from the time of the tort. 
There is no greater liability imposed upon the tort feasor 
than existed without contribution. 
Likewise/ the Joseph v. Lowery case cited by respondent 
(Respondent's brief/ p. 11) again forbids retroactive appli-
cation when a "duty to pay which did not exist at the time 
the damage was inflicted" is created. Here again, however, 
the joint tort feasor always had a duty to pay for the 
damages inflicted to the victim regardless of whether con-
tribution was in effect. 
In Point III of respondent's brief it is argued that 
"the right of contribution/ if one existsf is created at the 
time of the accident" and merely vests upon the payment by 
one joint feasor of a disproportionate amount of recovery. 
Hence/ the "inchoate" right at the time of the accident 
should control. 
Such an argument is illogical. For example/ there are 
thousands of instances every day where persons are given 
incidental or inchoate rights which may ripen into a cause 
of action subsequently. A person may be named as a benefi-
ciary of a will but because of contingencies stated in the 
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may never inherit or have the right to contest the will. 
Or, as in the Silver King Coalition Mines Company case cited 
by appellant in its main brief, a person may have a right 
to recover for the wrongful death of a relative under the 
Occupational Disease Act but such right does not become 
actionable until all of the circumstances giving rise to the 
cause of action have occurred. As stated by this court in 
the Siver King Coalition Mines case "it is often said that 
a right is not fvested1 unless it is something more than 
such a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated 
continuation of the present laws". 268 P.2d at 692. 
Thus, it is the time when a cause of action for con-
tribution becomes complete and not the "incidental or in-
choate right" arising from the accident itself which should 
govern the time sequence of a contribution lawsuit. It is 
the final act of payment of a disproportionate share of 
liability which creates a cause of action, just as it is the 
final acceptance of an offer which makes a contract binding. 
Respondents reasoning, as to a contract situation, 
would require a court to look at the law at the time an 
original offer was made regardless of what the law was at 
the time the acceptance was given since, respondent would 
argue, the initial offer was an inchoate right which would 
eventually lead to a cause of action on the contract. 
Obviously, courts examine an event at the time the "cause 
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of action" arises regardless of what events preceded it: in 
this case, therefore, there has been no cause of action 
arising and appellant should not be barred from instigating 
this third-party action. 
Finally, it should be noted that respondent has failed 
in his brief to cite a single case involving contribution 
per se. Rather, respondent has exclusively cited cases 
involving comparative negligence, which as stated previ-
ously, is not in point concerning the application of con-
tribution statutes. 
The respondent in his brief fails to distinguish the 
numerous cases cited by appellant from the states of Calif-
ornia, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missis-
sippi, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin which have all held that the time for computing a 
claim based upon contribution does not begin until after a 
pro rata share of a judgment has been paid by a joint tort 
feasor. For this reason, therefore, the trial court erred 
in holding that the contribution statute would be applied 
retroactively when, in fact, no retroactive application is 
necessary since no payments have yet been made by the 
appellants. 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION 
STATUTE DOES NOT TAKE AWAY OR IMPAIR 
VESTED RIGHTS ACQUIRED UNDER EXISTING 
LAWS PRIOR TO ITS ENACTMENT, DOES NOT 
CREATE A NEW OBLIGATION, DOES NOT IMPOSE 
A NEW DUTY, AND DOES NOT ATTACH A NEW 
DISABILITY IN RESPECT TO TRANSACTIONS 
OR CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY PAST. 
The question of whether the Contribution Act is substan-
tive or procedural law is completely academic since the cause 
of action in a contribution suit does not arise until payment 
is made. However, assuming arguendo that retroactive appli-
cation of the contribution statutes must be made, it is 
still evident that no substantive law has been affected by 
those statutes specifically relating to contribution. 
Appellants and respondent are in agreement as to the 
definition of substantive law and also agree that Section 
68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953 is controlling except as to those laws 
which do not affect substantive rights as distinguished from 
adjective law which pertains to practice and procedure. How-
ever , the disagreement between respondent and appellants seems 
to be centered upon which law is being analyzed and the effect 
it has upon substantive rights. 
Once again, the respondent refers to the "Comparative 
Negligence Act" and cites the Oregon case of Joseph v. Lowery 
as controlling authority. Unfortunately, however, respondent 
again has relied upon an analysis of the comparative negligence 
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statutes relating to liability between a tort feasor and a 
victim and has avoided the issue of contribution among joint 
tort feasors. 
In the Lowery case, for example, the statute referred to 
in respondent's brief concerned only the adoption of a compara-
tive negligence standard. (Respondent's Brief, p. 18-19). 
That statute stated: 
Contributory negligence, including assumption of 
the risk, shall not bar recovery in an action by 
any person or his legal representative to recover 
damages for negligence resulting in death or 
injury to person or property if such negli-
gence contributing to the injury was not as 
great as the negligence of the person against 
whom recovery is sought, but any damages al-
lowed shall be diminished in the proportion 
to the amount of such negligence attributable 
to the persons recovering. Oregon Laws 1971, 
Ch. 68, Section 1, 495 P.2d 273 at 275. 
If this action concerned Section 78-27-37 and 38 of the 
Utah Code, respondent's authorities would be germane and 
perhaps persuasive that the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence should not be retroactively applied since the rights 
and obligations existing between a tort feasor and the 
injured party may be said to be altered. However, it has 
never been argued by either plaintiff or the appellants 
that comparative negligence should apply to this lawsuit. 
The sole question is whether Sections 78-27-39 through 43 
are applicable as between respondent Zigich and appellants. 
-9-
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This crucial distinction has not been followed by respondent 
in his brief. 
Respondent attempts to distinguish the case of Silver 
King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial Commission, 268 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1954) by arguing that the "cause of action" 
in that case did not exist until after the amended statute 
had been passed, while asserting that the cause of action in 
this case arose prior to the Comparative Negligence Act 
(Respondent's brief, p. 20-21). It is difficult to under-
stand how respondent can distinguish the Silver King Coali-
tion Mine Company case in this manner since even the author-
ities cited by respondent admit that the cause of action 
does not become complete until the disproportionate payment 
by one of the joint tort feasors. See respondent's brief, 
p. 25 and citation from 18 Am.Jur.2d Section 47. 
A "cause of action" has been defined by this court as 
a "aggregate of operative facts which give rise to one or 
more relations of right-duty between two or more persons". 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 
919, 923 (Utah 1943). It is no more logical to say that 
"appellants1 claim for contribution comes into effect . . . 
at the time of the accident which produces plaintiff's 
claim against him" (Respondent's brief, p. 21) than to say 
that the cause of action in Silver King Coalition Mines 
Company arose at the time the decedent became employed with 
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the mining corporation and began to contract silicosis. It 
is only when the operative facts become "complete" that the 
legal right called a "cause of action" can be enforced. In 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company the final fact was 
death; in the instant case the final fact is a dispropor-
tionate payment to the plaintiff. Until this payment is 
made, therefore, the cause of action is not complete for 
purposes of determining the application of statutes. 
Finally, it must again be noted that respondent failed 
to cite a single case involving the question of substantive 
rights as applied to contribution statutes and fails to dis-
tinguish those cases cited by appellant in its main brief 
from California, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Michigan, 
and New York which have specifically held that contribution 
does not affect a substantive right but is only a change in 
remedy which creates no new obligations or burdens. 
The overwhelming weight of authority supports appellants' 
alternate position that no substantive rights have been im-
paired with the enactment of the contribution statutes and, 
therefore, retroactive application can be made if deemed 
necessary. 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT WAS PREMATURE 
SINCE NO PAYMENT HAD BEEN MADE IN EXCESS 
OF DEFENDANTS PRO RATA SHARE OF COMMON 
LIABILITY. 
Respondent has failed to respond to Point III of appel-
lant fs main brief so that it must be assumed respondent agrees 
with appellant's analysis of Rule 14a of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and agrees with the authorities cited in sup-
port thereof that third-party complaints for contribution may 
be brought prematurely in the interest of judicial economy 
and consistent results. Further comment is unnecessary on 
this point• 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT IS IN ERROR WHEN HE ARGUES THAT 
APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS ARE NOT JOINT 
TORT FEASORS FOR THE PURPOSES OF CONTRI-
BUTION IN THAT THEIR LIABILITY IS NOT 
COMMON. 
Respondent argues that he cannot be a joint tort feasor 
with appellants because of the protection of the Utah Guest 
statute (Respondent's brief/ pp. 27-30). Respondents failed 
to point out, however, that appellants1 third-party com-
plaint alleges that respondent was intoxicated at the time 
of the accident and was guilty of wilful misconduct. Respon-
dent also fails to state that affidavits filed subsequent to 
the complaint recited that the alcohol level in respondent's 
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blood on the morning of the accident was ,07 per cent. (R. 
95-96). 
A portion of the Utah Guest statute, Section 49-9-1, Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 reads as follows: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
relieving the owner or driver or person respon-
sible for the operation of a vehicle from lia-
bility for injury to or death of such guest 
proximately resulting from the intoxication or 
wilful misconduct of such owner, driver or per-
son responsible for the operation of such 
vehicle. 
Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Ann., 1953, establishes presump-
tions of intoxication based on alcohol content of blood by 
weight, for use in civil suits. Section 41-6-44 (b)(2) reads 
as follows: 
If there was at that time in excess of .05 per 
cent but less than .08 per cent by weight of 
alcohol in the person's blood, such facts 
shall not give rise to any presumption that 
the person was or was not under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be 
considered with other competent evidence in 
determining whether the person was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. (Emphasis 
added). 
The question of respondent's intoxication is one for a 
trier of fact. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that 
respondent would not be liable to the plaintiff under immunity 
of the Utah Guest statute. For this reason, it cannot be said 
as a matter of law that there is no "common liability" between 
appellant and respondent and therefore respondent's argument 
to the contrary must be discarded. 
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POINT V 
RESPONDENT IS IN ERROR IN CLAIMING THAT THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN AS TO THE 
RESPONDENT IN ANY ACTION EMINATING FROM THE 
WRONGFUL DEATH OF LOUISE BRUYNER. 
Respondent states in his brief "as respondent can have 
no liability to the plaintiff for the wrongful death allega-
tions of his complaint/ because of the statute of limitations/ 
the appellants cannot not circumvent the lack of liability 
between respondent and the plaintiff by third-party complaint 
for contribution due to the statute of limitations" (Respon-
dent's brief/ p. 31). This statement is completely erroneous. 
It is well settled that a cause of action for contribu-
tion is separate and distinct from the underlying cause of 
action for tort in which the cause of action for contribution 
has its roots. Accordingly, the statute of limitations gov-
erning such underlying action for tort does not apply to the 
action for contribution, and the period within which an 
injured party must commence his action for tort, and the 
fact that such period has expired, are irrelevant when a 
joint tort feasor seeks contribution from another with whom 
he shares joint liability. See "What Statute of Limitations 
Applies to Actions for Contribution Against Joint Tort 
Feasor", 57 A.L.R.3d 927, 929. See also Prosser, Law of 
Torts (3rd Edition), p. 309 ("It is generally agreed that 
the fact that the statute of limitations has run against the 
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original plaintiff's action does not bar a suit for con-
tribution, since that cause of action does not arise until 
payment"). 
Finally, it should be noted that the annotation cited by 
respondent at 26 A.L.R.3d 1283 is entitled "Automobiles: 
Right of Third-Person to Recover Contribution from Host 
Driver for Injuries or Death of Guest, Where Host is not 
Liable to Guest under Guest Statute". This annotation 
merely states, which has never been disputed by appellants, 
that if respondent Zigich is not liable under the guest 
statute to the plaintiff then no right of contribution 
exists between appellants and respondent. As previously 
noted, however, whether respondent is protected by the quest 
statute will depend upon a jury's determination as to the 
respondent's intoxication at the time of the accident. 
Therefore, because the statute of limitations has not 
even begun to run against the appellants, respondent's 
"statute of limitations" argument is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent in his brief has failed to confront the issue 
now before this court i.e., whether appellant has a third-
party claim against respondent based upon the contribution 
statutes. Respondent's characterization of "contribution" 
as "comparative negligence" is not supported by law or 
logic. Respondent has cited no authority specifically 
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relating to contribution that negates the large number of 
authorities cited by appellants in their main brief. It can 
only be assumed, therefore, that appellants' position is 
the one which is followed throughout other jurisdictions 
relating to this contribution question. 
The determination by this court that the cause of action 
in a contribution suit does not arise until a joint tort 
feasor pays to a plaintiff a disproportionate share of his 
liability (as required in Section 78-27-39), would conform 
to numerous other jurisdictions which have made this same 
determination, would create no problem of confusion among 
the courts since an easily understandable standard of time 
would exist, and would equitably distribute the liability 
among joint tort feasors as was intended by the legislature 
in the passage of the contribution statutes. 
For these reasons, the order of the trial court dis-
missing the third-party complaint of appellants must be re-
versed and the case remanded to the lower court for trial on 
the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
Kim R. Wilson 
Harold G. Christensen 
Craig S. Cook 
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